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Abstract
In the standard single-dimensional model of position auctions, bidders agree on the
relative values of the positions and each of them submits a single bid that is interpreted
in terms of these values. Motivated by current practice in sponsored search we consider
a situation where the auctioneer uses estimates of the relative values, which may be
imprecise, and show that under both complete and incomplete information a non-
truthful mechanism is able to support an efficient outcome in equilibrium for a wider
range of these estimates than the VCG mechanism. We thus exhibit a property of
the VCG mechanism that may help explain the surprising rarity with which it is used
even in settings with unit demand, a relative lack of robustness to misspecification of
the bidding language. The result for complete information concerns the generalized
second-price mechanism and lends additional theoretical support to the use of this
mechanism in practice. Particularly interesting from a technical perspective is the
result for incomplete information, which is driven by a surprising connection between
equilibrium bids in the VCG mechanism and the generalized first-price mechanism.
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1 Introduction
The Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism stands as one of the pillars of mechanism de-
sign theory, but in the real world is used with surprising rarity. Past work has attributed this
mismatch between theory and practice to a number of properties that affect the mechanism
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in certain settings, like susceptibility to collusion or prohibitive computational costs [3, 40].
Here we identify another property of the mechanism that may be problematic in practice, a
relative lack of robustness to misspecification of the bidding language. Unlike most of the
known deficiencies it applies already in settings with unit demand.
1.1 The Model
Our point of departure is the standard position auction model of Edelman et al. [25] and
Varian [42], where n bidders compete for the assignment of k positions. Bidders have unit
demand and the valuation of bidder i for position j is given by βj · vi, where vi is a bidder-
specific value and a non-increasing vector β = (β1, . . . , βk) describes the relative values
of the positions. The most prominent application of this model is to sponsored search,
which contributed a significant fraction to Google’s advertising revenue of around $95 billion
in 2017 [2]. What is rather curious is that the most successful sponsored search services to
date have used non-truthful auction mechanisms rather than the VCG mechanism. GoTo,
later re-branded as Overture and acquired by Yahoo, was the first company to provide such
a service and used a generalized first-price (GFP) mechanism. Google and Microsoft use a
generalized second-price (GSP) mechanism. Facebook does use the VCG mechanism to place
ads, but not in the context of sponsored search and not in a position auction.1 It is hard to
say in retrospect what led to the selection of the non-truthful mechanisms, and changing the
mechanism at this point would clearly come with huge financial risks. We will see, however,
that under certain assumptions choosing the non-truthful mechanisms may have been wise
even if it was not entirely deliberate.
Edelman et al., Varian, and much of the subsequent literature have considered mecha-
nisms that from each bidder i solicit a single bid bi, which is then interpreted as a vector
of bids βj · bi, one for each position j, to determine a one-to-one assignment of bidders to
positions and a monetary payment for each bidder. The conflation of a vector of bids into a
single bid mirrors practical mechanisms [e.g., 18, 29]. It is a deliberate design decision that
greatly increases ease of use for the bidders and has also been shown across mechanisms to
eliminate certain outcomes that are undesirable from the auctioneer’s point of view [37].
Any real-world use of a mechanism requires a choice of bidding language and bears a risk
of misspecification. In the case of sponsored search the assumption that may be problematic
is that the auctioneer knows the exact value of β, which in practice is inferred using techniques
from statistical machine learning [30, 36]. While these techniques are capable of producing
fairly accurate estimates, they will typically not produce an estimate that is entirely exact.2
1The ad selection and pricing problem faced by Facebook is indeed very different from a position auction,
as ads come in different formats and can be placed flexibly within the news feed or next to it. The situation
is similar for contextual ads in sponsored search [43].
2It is worth pointing out here that search engines do observe when an ad is clicked. Thus, if the relative
values of the positions were exactly proportional to the relative number of clicks, all auctions we consider
could be implemented without any knowledge of β [43]. There are, however, good reasons why the value of a
position may depend on other factors besides the probability of a click. Milgrom [37] for example considers
a situation with two types of users of a search engine, one of them genuinely interested in the products
being advertised and one merely curious. The two types come with different rates at which clicks on an
advertisement result in a purchase, but are indistinguishable from the point of view of the search engine.
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The result will be a slight misspecification of the bidding language, such that the way in
which a single bid is extrapolated to bids on individual positions is not completely aligned
with the actual relative values of the positions. Our goal will be to analyze how robust
different mechanisms are to this kind of misspecification.
To this end, we consider a generalization of the standard model in which mechanisms
work with bids αj · bi, where α = (α1, . . . , αk) is a non-increasing vector and generally
α 6= β. We then compare the performance of different mechanisms as α and β vary, and ask
specifically for which values of α and β each mechanism possesses an efficient equilibrium. We
follow the usual approach of analyzing bidder behavior via game-theoretic reasoning, under
the assumption that each bidder tries to maximize the value of the position it is assigned
minus its payment.3 In addition to the standard model of auction theory, where bidders
only have incomplete information about one another’s valuations, it has become common to
analyze position auctions also in a complete-information model where valuations are common
knowledge among the bidders. This is motivated by practical auctions that provide bidders
with aggregate statistics of others’ bids and thus enable best-response bidding, by empirical
support that has been given for a family of Nash equilibria [42, 25], and by cyclic bidding
behavior observed in the absence of pure Nash equilibria [25]. Like the vast majority of
work on position auctions we focus on the maximization of welfare, which in practice can
be seen as a maximization of customer satisfaction to ensure long-term success. Extending
our results to the maximization of revenue nevertheless is an interesting direction for future
work.
1.2 Results
We show that under both complete and incomplete information, a non-truthful mechanism
is able to support an efficient outcome in equilibrium for a strictly larger set of values of α
and β than the VCG mechanism. Failure of the VCG mechanism to produce an efficient
outcome can in fact occur already when α is very close to β.
The result for complete information follows from a comparison with the GSP mechanism
and is obtained in Section 3 via the combination of two results. Existence of an efficient
equilibrium in the VCG mechanism is first shown to imply the existence of an efficient
outcome satisfying the stronger property of envy-freeness. Since envy-freeness is independent
of the underlying mechanism, it then suffices to show that the GSP mechanism is able to
produce an outcome with the same assignment and payments.
In Section 4 the same type of result is shown to hold under incomplete information, but
here the VCG mechanism is compared to the GFP mechanism and a more elaborate argument
is required to establish superiority of the latter. We begin by using a standard technique for
3Implicit in this approach is the assumption that a bidder can evaluate its utility and hence the relative
values of the positions. That bidders but not the auctioneer are aware of the relative values seems reasonable
in sponsored search, because the generation of value for an advertiser could be observable by that advertiser
but not by the search engine. In the model of Milgrom [37] involving two types of users of a search engine,
for example, advertisers would be able to observe purchase decisions on their websites but could be wary of
sharing this information with the search engine due to trust concerns.
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equilibrium characterization that equates the expected payments in an efficient equilibrium as
given by Myerson’s Lemma with the respective payments in the two mechanisms. This gives
us a candidate equilibrium bidding function for each of the two mechanisms, and each of these
functions constitutes an equilibrium if and only if it is strictly increasing almost everywhere.
In the case of the VCG mechanism we encounter an ordinary differential equation, which we
solve by appealing to a combinatorial equivalence. Even with the bidding functions for the
VCG and GFP mechanisms at hand it is not trivial to show that the latter is increasing for
a larger set of values of α and β, and we exploit a surprising connection between the two
functions to show that this is indeed the case.
Strict superiority of the non-truthful mechanisms, and potential failure of the VCG mech-
anism when α is very close to β, is shown in Sections 3.1 and 4.1 by means of two examples.
In these examples efficient equilibria cease to exist when mechanisms underestimate the
value of less valuable positions. This makes the less valuable positions more attractive by
reducing their associated payments, incentivizing bidders to shade their bid and do so more
strongly as their value increases. The relatively lower payments in the VCG mechanism, for
a fixed profile of bids, only magnify this effect and cause it to fail for smaller discrepancies
between α and β. In settings with sufficiently many positions the failure can also occur
when mechanisms overestimate the quality of some positions but underestimate the quality
of others. More generally, the GSP and GFP mechanisms seem to benefit from the relative
simplicity of their payments, which for a given position depend only on one bid. In the VCG
mechanism a particular bid may simultaneously affect the payments of many bidders, setting
the correct equilibrium payments thus becomes impossible more quickly as α and β move
out of alignment.4
The focus of our analysis is on standard mechanisms for position auctions and their
robustness to misspecification regarding the relative values of the positions. The investigation
of additional mechanisms and parameters, of more general settings, and of the interaction
between auction mechanisms and learning algorithms used to infer the parameters, provide
ample scope for future work.
1.3 Related Work
The risk of misspecification inherent in the choice of a bidding language recalls a common
aphorism in statistics, first formulated in this form by George Box [10], that “all models are
wrong.” To Box, the interesting question was not whether a model is an exact representation
of the real world, but whether it is close enough to the truth to be useful. The role of model
misspecification in mechanism design was recently highlighted by Madara´sz and Prat [35],
who designed a mechanism for the screening problem whose performance deteriorates grace-
4An orthogonal requirement for equilibrium existence that favors different non-truthful mechanisms under
complete and incomplete information is that a bidder’s ability to control its own payment must match the
degree of knowledge it has of other bidders’ valuations. It is well known, for example, that the GFP
mechanism may not possess a pure Nash equilibrium under complete information [25] and that the GSP
mechanisms may not possess an efficient Bayes-Nash equilibrium under incomplete information [28], even
when α = β.
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fully in the distance between assumed and true preferences. We consider instead the effect
of misspecification of the bidding language of an auction, and ask how much imprecision
different mechanisms can tolerate while still producing an efficient outcome.
An increased robustness of non-truthful mechanisms for position auctions in the sense
we discuss here was first suggested by Milgrom [37] and investigated further by Du¨tting
et al. [21]. The effect of misspecification of the bidding language on equilibria of the GSP
mechanisms was studied also by Abrams et al. [1] and by Blumrosen et al. [9]. What dis-
tinguishes our results from this past work is that we elucidate, for any given value of β, which
values of α enable the existence of an efficient equilibrium in different mechanisms that use
α as an estimate of β. They thus apply to mechanisms currently in use, and allow us to
draw conclusions about the relative robustness of these mechanisms to misspecification.
The performance of the VCG mechanism and that of alternative, non-truthful mecha-
nisms has already been compared in the standard position auction model, where α = β, and
a number of authors have noted certain advantages or lack of disadvantages of the alter-
native mechanisms. Under complete information the GSP mechanism obtains the truthful
VCG outcome in a locally envy-free equilibrium, and payments that at least match those of
the truthful VCG outcome in any locally envy-free equilibrium [25, 42]. While the former
is true for a whole class of mechanisms that rank bidders in order of their bids, the GSP
mechanism is the simplest mechanism within this class [4]. Under incomplete information
the GFP mechanism admits a unique Bayes-Nash equilibrium, which in expectation yields
the truthful VCG outcome [14]. Each of the two mechanisms has severe disadvantages in the
respective other setting, such as non-existence of a pure Nash equilibrium or of an efficient
Bayes-Nash equilibrium [25, 28]. In cases where equilibria exist, however, the worst-case
welfare loss is bounded in the sense of a small price of anarchy [12].5 When α = β, and other
things being equal, the VCG mechanism of course has the advantage of truthfulness across
complete- and incomplete-information environments.
Our work highlights one advantage of non-truthful mechanisms for position auctions. A
concurrent line of work has identified additional advantages of non-revelation mechanisms,
such as amenability to statistical inference [16] and guaranteed revenue in dynamic set-
tings [32] and across complete- and incomplete-information environments [19].
Our results finally fit more generally into an increasing body of work that emphasizes
robustness and simplicity in economic and algorithmic design. Relevant examples of this
type of work in economics include a theory of mechanisms with more robust knowledge
assumptions [6, 7, 13] and the use of a greedy mechanism in the FCC Incentive Auction
to achieve computational and strategic simplicity [38, 23, 24]. Additional examples come
from algorithmic game theory, where recent work has obtained simple mechanisms with
near-optimal revenue [31, 15, 5] or welfare [17, 8, 26, 20, 27, 22], but has also pointed out
computational barriers to near-optimal equilibria [11, 41].
5In the language of the price-of-anarchy literature we essentially seek to characterize those values of α
and β for which the price of stability is one. Arguments similar to the ones used to establish the price-of-
anarchy guarantees for the standard model also apply to the more general setting we study here, providing
welfare guarantees that degrade gracefully in α and β.
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2 Preliminaries
We study the standard setting of position auctions with k positions ordered by quality
and n ≥ k bidders with unit demand and single-dimensional valuations for the positions.6
Denote by Rk≥ = {x ∈ Rk : xj > 0, xj ≥ xj′ if j < j′} the set of k-dimensional vectors whose
entries are positive and non-increasing. Given β ∈ Rk≥, which we assume to be common
knowledge among the bidders, the valuation of a particular bidder i can then be represented
by a scalar vi ∈ R, such that βjvi ≥ 0 is the bidder’s value for position j. We will use the
notational convention that βj = 0 when j > k.
A mechanism in this setting receives a profile b ∈ Rn of bids, assigns positions to bidders
in a one-to-one fashion, and charges each bidder a non-negative payment. It can be repre-
sented by a pair (g, p) of an allocation rule g : Rn → Sn and a payment rule p : Rn → Rn,
such that for each i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, gi(b) = j for j ∈ {1, . . . , k} means that bidder i is assigned
position j and pi(b) is the payment charged to bidder i. We will be concerned exclusively
with mechanisms that assign positions in non-increasing order of bids, and henceforth denote
by g an allocation rule that does so and breaks ties in an arbitrary but consistent manner.
The role of payments is to incentivize bids resulting in an efficient assignment, i.e., one where
positions are assigned in order of valuations and social welfare
∑n
i=1 βgi(b)vi is maximized.
In reasoning about strategic behavior we make the usual assumption of quasi-linear pref-
erences and consider two different models of information regarding the preferences of other
bidders. Under quasi-linear preferences, the utility ui(b, vi) of bidder i with value vi, in a
given mechanism and for a given bid profile b, is equal to its valuation for the position it
is assigned minus its payment, i.e., ui(b, vi) = βgi(b)vi − pi(b). In the complete information
model the values vi are common knowledge among the bidders. A bid profile b is a Nash
equilibrium of a given mechanism if no bidder has an incentive to change its bid assuming
that the other bidders don’t change their bids, i.e., if for every i ∈ N ,
ui
(
b, vi
)
= max
x∈R
ui
(
(b−i, x), vi
)
,
where (b−i, x) = (b1, . . . , bi−1, x, bi+1, . . . , bn). A Nash equilibrium b is efficient if for all
i, j ∈ {1, . . . , n}, bi > bj whenever vi > vj.
In the incomplete information model values vi are drawn independently from a continuous
distribution with density function f , cumulative distribution function F , and support [0, v¯]
for some finite v¯ ∈ R+ we assume to be common knowledge among the bidders.7 Our results
in addition require existence and boundedness of the first three derivatives of F . Since
valuations are independent and identically distributed, an efficient assignment for all value
profiles can only be obtained from a symmetric profile (b, . . . , b) for some bidding function
6The assumption that n ≥ k is without loss of generality, as in a setting with n < k bidders the k − n
lowest-valued positions would never be assigned by the mechanisms we consider.
7An analytical characterization of equilibria in the case of non-identical distributions is, unfortunately,
well beyond the state of the art even for very simple settings. For a single item and two bidders with values
drawn uniformly from distinct intervals, for example, this question was posed by Vickrey [44] and answered
only recently, almost half a century later, by Kaplan and Zamir [33].
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b : R→ R. The quantity of interest for strategic considerations under incomplete information
is the expected utility ubi(x, vi) of bidder i with value vi given that it bids x ∈ R and all other
bidders use bidding function b, which is given by
ubi(x, vi) = Evj∼F,j 6=i
[
ui
(
vi,
(
b(v1), . . . , b(vi−1), x, b(vi+1), . . . , b(vn)
))]
.
Bidding function b then is a Bayes-Nash equilibrium if no bidder has an incentive to change
its bid, i.e., if for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n} and vi ∈ [0, v¯],
ubi(b(vi), vi) = max
x∈R
ubi(x, vi). (1)
A Bayes-Nash equilibrium b is efficient if it is increasing almost everywhere.
A mechanism that achieves efficiency in both Nash and Bayes-Nash equilibrium is the
Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism. It uses allocation rule g and a payment rule pβ
that charges each bidder its externality on the other bidders, which is equal to the additional
utility bidders assigned lower positions would obtain by moving up one position. Denoting
by b(i) the (n−i+1)st order statistic of b, such that b(1) ≥ · · · ≥ b(n), and using the convention
that b(i) = 0 when i > n,
pβi (b) =
k∑
j=gi(b)
(βj − βj+1)b(j+1).
It is well known and not difficult to see that the VCG mechanism makes it optimal for
each bidder to bid its true valuation irrespective of the bids of others, which is a stronger
property than those required of a Nash or Bayes-Nash equilibrium. The resulting assignment
is efficient. The resulting outcome of assignment and payments is in fact the bidder-optimal
core outcome, and we will refer to it by that name.
While computation of payments in the VCG mechanism requires knowledge of the vec-
tor β of relative values, we will be interested instead in the ability of mechanisms to support
an efficient outcome in equilibrium when only an inaccurate estimate α ∈ Rk≥ of β is available
to the auctioneer. To this end we consider parameterized variants of the three mechanisms
that have been used and studied most extensively: the α-VCG mechanism, the α-GFP
mechanism, and the α-GSP mechanism. The three mechanisms all use allocation rule g, and
their payment rules pV, pF, and pS respectively charge a bidder its externality, its bid on the
position it is assigned, and the next-lower bid on that position. Using the convention that
αj = 0 when j > k,
pVi (b) =
k∑
j=gi(b)
(αj − αj+1)b(j+1),
pFi (b) = αgi(b)bi, and
pSi (b) = αgi(b)b(gi(b)+1).
We will sometimes drop superscripts when the mechanism we are referring to is clear from
the context.
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3 Complete Information
We begin our analysis with the complete-information case. Here, when α = β, the α-
VCG mechanism has a truthful equilibrium, the α-GSP mechanism has an equilibrium that
yields the bidder-optimal core outcome [25, 42], and the α-GFP mechanism may not have
any equilibrium [14]. When α 6= β the α-VCG mechanism loses its truthfulness, and it
makes sense to ask under what conditions the α-VCG mechanism and the α-GSP mechanism
possess an efficient equilibrium. To build intuition we first look at the special case with three
positions and three bidders, before moving on to the general case.
3.1 Three Positions and Three Bidders
In the special case, valuations are given by vectors v ∈ R3 and β ∈ R3≥ while mechanisms use
a vector α ∈ R3≥ that may differ from β. Our goal will be to understand which combinations
of α and β allow for the existence of a bid profile b ∈ R3 that is an equilibrium and leads to
an efficient assignment. Assuming without loss of generality that v1 ≥ v2 ≥ v3 > 0, efficiency
requires that
b1 ≥ b2 ≥ b3. (2)
For b to be an equilibrium, none of the bidders may benefit from raising or lowering their
respective bid and being assigned a different position. For the α-VCG mechanism this means
that
β1v1 − (α1 − α2)b2 − (α2 − α3)b3 ≥ β2v1 − (α2 − α3)b3, (3)
β1v1 − (α1 − α2)b2 − (α2 − α3)b3 ≥ β3v1, (4)
β2v2 − (α2 − α3)b3 ≥ β1v2 − (α1 − α2)b1 − (α2 − α3)b3, (5)
β2v2 − (α2 − α3)b3 ≥ β3v2, (6)
β3v3 ≥ β1v3 − (α1 − α2)b1 − (α2 − α3)b2, (7)
β3v3 ≥ β2v3 − (α2 − α3)b2. (8)
There is no upper bound on b1 and no lower bound on b3 except b3 ≥ 0, and setting b1
to a large value and b3 = 0 satisfies (2), (5), (6), and (7). With this choice of b3, and
since β2v1 ≥ β3v1, (4) is implied by (3). The α-VCG mechanism thus possesses an efficient
equilibrium if and only if there exists a bid b2 such that
(α1 − α2)b2 ≤ (β1 − β2)v1, (9)
(α2 − α3)b2 ≥ (β2 − β3)v3. (10)
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For the α-GSP mechanism the equilibrium conditions require that
β1v1 − α1b2 ≥ β2v1 − α2b3, (11)
β1v1 − α1b2 ≥ β3v1, (12)
β2v2 − α2b3 ≥ β1v2 − α1b1, (13)
β2v2 − α2b3 ≥ β3v2, (14)
β3v3 ≥ β1v3 − α1b1, (15)
β3v3 ≥ β2v3 − α2b2. (16)
There is again no upper bound on b1, and setting b1 to a large value satisfies (13) and
(15). It is, moreover, not difficult to see that (12) is implied by (11) and (14): by (14),
α2b3 ≤ (β2 − β3)v2, so (11) implies that β1v1 − α1b2 ≥ β2v1 − (β2 − β3)v2; since v1 ≥ v2, this
in turn implies (12). The α-GSP mechanism thus possesses an efficient equilibrium if and
only if there exist bids b2 ≥ b3 such that
α1b2 ≤ (β1 − β2)v1 + α2b3, (17)
α2b3 ≤ (β2 − β3)v2, (18)
α2b2 ≥ (β2 − β3)v3. (19)
To see that the constraints for the α-GSP mechanism are generally weaker than those
for the α-VCG mechanism, note that the former can be satisfied even under the additional
restriction that b2 = b3 if there exists a bid b2 such that
(α1 − α2)b2 ≤ (β1 − β2)v1, (20)
α2b2 ≥ (β2 − β3)v3. (21)
Indeed, any such bid satisfies (17) and (19), while the smallest such bid satisfies (18) as well.
The claim now follows because (20) is identical to (9) and (21) easier to satisfy than (10).
The latter comparison will in fact be strict when α3 > 0.
When α3 = 0 there is no strict separation and the two mechanisms are in fact identical,
but this is a viable design choice only in the absence of a fourth bidder, when the payment
for the last position is always zero. When there is a fourth bidder, then for both mechanisms
α3 > 0 becomes a necessary condition for the existence of an efficient equilibrium and the
separation between the mechanisms is strict. A formal treatment of the case with three
positions and four bidders is given in Appendix A. This treatment also suggests that the
analysis becomes significantly more difficult as the number of positions and bidders increases
and can no longer be solved by a straightforward comparison of the respective equilibrium
conditions.
To further illustrate the separation between the two mechanisms, note that when βi 6= βj
and αi 6= αj for all i 6= j, (9) and (10) can be satisfied if and only if
α2 ≥ α1(β2 − β3)v3 + α3(β1 − β2)v1
(β1 − β2)v1 + (β2 − β3)v3 ,
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β3
v1+(1−β3)v3
β3v1+(1−β3)v3
1
1
α3 = β3
β2
α
2
α-GSP
α-VCG
Figure 1: Comparison of the α-GSP and α-VCG mechanisms under complete information,
for a setting with three positions and three bidders where β1 = α1 = 1 and 0 < β3 = α3 < 1.
The hatched areas indicate the combinations of α2 and β2 for which the two mechanisms
respectively possess an efficient equilibrium. The dotted line illustrates the performance of
the mechanisms for a particular value of β2. When v1 = 10, v3 = 6, and α3 = β3 = 0.3,
this line would lie at β2 = 0.8 and would intersect the curve for the α-GSP mechanism at
α2 = 0.6 and that for the α-VCG mechanism at α2 = 0.72. Any point on the dotted line
between these two intersection points corresponds to a value of α2 for which the α-GSP
mechanism possesses an efficient equilibrium and the α-VCG mechanism does not.
and (17), (18), and (19) if and only if
α2 ≥ α1(β2 − β3)v3
(β1 − β2)v1 + (β2 − β3)v3 .
We compare these bounds in Figure 1. The bounds suggest that only an underestimation of β
is problematic, while efficient equilibria are preserved by both mechanisms when α ≥ β. The
analysis in Appendix A shows that this, also, is an artifact of the case with three positions
and three bidders and ceases to hold when there is an additional bidder.
3.2 The General Case
We proceed to show that superiority of the α-GSP mechanism over the α-VCG mechanism in
preserving efficient equilibria also holds in general. The following result establishes a weak su-
periority for arbitrary numbers of bidders and positions and arbitrary valuations. Examples
in which only the α-GSP mechanism preserves an efficient equilibrium are straightforward
to construct, and indeed we have already done so for a specific setting.
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Theorem 1. Let α, β ∈ Rk≥, v ∈ Rn. Then the α-GSP mechanism possesses an efficient
Nash equilibrium for valuations given by β and v whenever the α-VCG mechanism does.
Rather than by a direct comparison of the equilibrium conditions of the two mechanisms,
as we have done in the special case, we prove the theorem by appealing to the stronger
requirement of envy-freeness, which has played a significant role also in earlier work on VCG
and GSP position auctions [42, 25]. We first show, in Lemma 1, that existence of an efficient
Nash equilibrium in the α-VCG mechanism implies the existence of an efficient bid profile
satisfying envy-freeness. Here, bid profile b is called envy-free if no bidder prefers a different
position to the one it is currently assigned at the current payment for the former, i.e., if for
all i ∈ {1, . . . , n},
βgi(b)vi − pi(b) = maxj∈{1,...,n} βgj(b)vi − pj(b). (22)
For both the α-VCG mechanism and the α-GSP mechanism envy-freeness implies the equi-
librium condition because the current payment is a lower bound on the actual payment of the
bidder if by either mechanism it was assigned that position. Moreover, and in contrast to the
equilibrium condition, envy-freeness can be viewed as a requirement that depends only on
the allocation and payments and not on the underlying mechanism. We can thus complete
the proof by establishing the existence of a mapping from bid profiles in the α-VCG mecha-
nism to bid profiles in α-GSP mechanism that preserves allocation and payments, which we
do in Lemma 2.
Assume without loss of generality that v1 ≥ v2 ≥ · · · ≥ vn and that in an efficient
allocation, for 1 ≤ i ≤ min{n, k}, bidder i is assigned position i. Specializing and rearranging
(1), a bid profile b with b1 ≥ · · · ≥ bn is a Nash equilibrium of the α-VCG mechanism if for
all i, j ∈ {1, . . . , n},
(αj − αj+1)bj ≥ (βj − βi)vi −
i−1∑
t=j+1
(αt − αt+1)bt if j < i, (23)
(αi − αi+1)bi+1 ≤ (βi − βj)vi −
j−1∑
t=i+1
(αt − αt+1)bt+1 if j > i. (24)
These conditions constrain the utility of bidder i if instead of position i it was assigned a
position j that is respectively above or below i. Note that in the latter case the payment of
bidder i for position j is equal to the current payment for this position, where in the former
case it may be higher. Specializing (22), a bid profile b with b1 ≥ · · · ≥ bn is envy-free if for
all i, j ∈ {1, . . . , n}, in addition to (24) and instead of (23),8
(αj − αj+1)bj+1 ≥ (βj − βi)vi −
i−1∑
t=j+1
(αt − αt+1)bt+1 if j < i. (25)
8Condition (25) is, unlike (23), symmetric to (24). Varian [42] therefore refers to bid profiles satisfying (25)
and (24) as symmetric equilibria.
11
Envy-freeness is a stronger requirement than that of being an equilibrium, but we will
see that it comes for free in the sense that existence of an efficient equilibrium automatically
implies existence of an efficient equilibrium satisfying envy-freeness.
Lemma 1. Let α, β ∈ Rk≥ and v ∈ Rn≥, and assume that the α-VCG mechanism possesses
an efficient equilibrium. Then the α-VCG mechanism possesses an efficient equilibrium that
is envy-free.
Proof. We will show existence and envy-freeness of a particular type of efficient equilibrium
that we will call bidder-pessimal, in which each of the bids b2, . . . , bn is maximal among all
efficient equilibria.9
First note that (23) only imposes lower bounds on the bids and remains satisfied when
bids are increased. For (24), the case where j = i+ 1 implies all other cases, because
(βi − βj)vi −
j−1∑
t=i+1
(αt − αt+1)bt+1 ≥ (βi − βj)vi −
j−1∑
t=i+1
(βt − βt+1)vt
≥ (βi − βj)vi −
j−1∑
t=i+1
(βt − βt+1)vi
= (βi − βi+1)vi,
where the first inequality holds because, by the fact that b is an efficient equilibrium and
hence by (24), (αt − αt+1)bt+1 ≤ (βt − βt+1)vt when i + 1 ≤ t ≤ j − 1, and the second
inequality because, by efficiency, vt ≤ vi for all such t. Bid bi, for i ∈ {2, . . . , n}, thus is
subject to only two upper bounds on, bi ≤ bi−1 by efficiency and (αi−1−αi)bi ≤ (βi−1−βi)vi−1
by (24). Increasing each of these bids as much as possible yields a bid profile b such for all
i ∈ {2, . . . , n},
bi =
{
min
(
bi−1,
(βi−1−βi)vi−1
αi−1−αi
)
if αi−1 6= αi,
bi−1 otherwise.
(26)
We now claim that b satisfies (25) and begin by showing this for the special case where
j = i− 1, which requires that for all i ∈ {2, . . . , n},
(αi−1 − αi)bi ≥ (βi−1 − βi)vi. (27)
By (26) it suffices to distinguish two cases. If αi−1 6= αi and bi = (βi−1−βi)vi−1/(αi−1−αi),
then
(αi−1 − αi)bi = (βi−1 − βi)vi−1 ≥ (βi−1 − βi)vi,
where the inequality holds because vi ≥ vi+1. If instead bi = bi−1, then
(αi−1 − αi)bi = (αi−1 − αi)bi−1 ≥ (βi−1 − βi)vi,
9In the case where α = β, the truthful equilibrium of the α-VCG mechanism is bidder-optimal among all
envy-free outcomes, i.e., its bids and payments are minimal [34].
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where the inequality holds by (23).
For the general case let i, j ∈ {1, . . . , n} with j < i. Then
(βj − βi)vi −
i−1∑
t=j+1
(αt − αt+1)bt+1 ≤ (βj − βi)vi −
i−1∑
t=j+1
(βt − βt+1)vt+1
≤ (βj − βi)vi −
i−1∑
t=j+1
(βt − βt+1)vi
= (βj − βj+1)vi
≤ (βj − βj+1)vj+1
≤ (αj − αj+1)bj+1,
where the first and last inequality hold because, by (27), (αt − αt+1)bt+1 ≥ (βt − βt+1)vt+1
for t = j + 1, . . . , i − 1 and (βj − βj+1)vj+1 ≤ (αj − αj+1)bj+1, and the second and third
inequality because vt+1 ≥ vi when t+ 1 ≤ i and vi ≤ vj when j < i.10
We proceed to show that any bid profile in the α-VCG mechanism can be mapped to a
bid profile that in the α-GSP mechanism yields the same allocation and payments. Applying
this mapping to an efficient envy-free bid profile like the one identified by Lemma 1, and
noting that envy-freeness implies the equilibrium condition, then shows Theorem 1.
Lemma 2. Let α, β ∈ Rk≥ and v, b ∈ Rn≥. Let bS ∈ Rn such that for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n},
bSi =

bS2 if i = 1,
pVi−1(b)
αi−1
if i ∈ {2, . . . , k + 1} and αi−1 > 0,
0 otherwise.
Then bS1 ≥ · · · ≥ bSn and for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, pSi (bS) = pVi (b).
Proof. Note that bS1 = b
S
2 . Let j = min{i : αi = 0} and note that bSi = 0 when i > j. For
the first part of the claim it thus suffices to show that bSi ≥ bSi+1 for i = 2, . . . , j − 1, which
we do in two steps. First, for all i ∈ {2, . . . , j},
bSi =
pVi−1
αi−1
=
∑k
t=i−1(αt − αt+1)bt+1
αi−1
≤
∑k
t=i−1(αt − αt+1)bi
αi−1
=
(αi−1 − αk+1)bi
αi−1
= bi, (28)
where the first two equalities respectively hold by definition of bSi and p
V
i−1, the inequality
because b1 ≥ · · · ≥ bn, and the last equality because, by convention, αk+1 = 0. Then, for all
10In extending the claim from the special to the general case we have in fact shown that, subject to
efficiency, local envy-freeness with regard to the position directly above implies envy-freeness with regard
to all higher positions. Similar results have appeared in prior work [e.g., 42, Fact 5], but only for the case
where α = β.
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i ∈ {2, . . . , j − 1},
bSi =
pVi−1
αi−1
=
(αi−1 − αi)bi + pVi
αi−1
=
(αi−1 − αi)bi + αibSi+1
αi−1
≥ (αi−1 − αi)b
S
i+1 + αib
S
i+1
αi−1
= bSi+1,
where the first and third equalities hold by definition of bSi , the second equality exploits the
recursive nature of the definition of pVi−1, and the inequality uses that bi ≥ bi+1 and that,
by (28), bi+1 ≥ bSi+1.
The second part of the claim is satisfied for i < j because pSi = αib
S
i+1 = αip
V
i /αi = p
V
i ,
and for i ≥ j because αi = 0 for all i ≥ j and thus pSi = pVi = 0.
The above analysis in fact shows that any envy-free equilibrium of the α-VCG mechanism
is preserved by the α-GSP mechanism. Since the bidder-optimal core outcome is envy-
free [34], we thus have the following.
Corollary 1. Let α, β ∈ Rk≥, v ∈ Rn. Then the α-GSP mechanism obtains the bidder-
optimal core outcome in a Nash equilibrium for valuations given by β and v whenever the
α-VCG mechanism does.
4 Incomplete Information
We now turn to incomplete-information environments, where bidders only possess proba-
bilistic information regarding one another’s valuations. Here the α-GSP mechanism may fail
to possess an efficient equilibrium even when α = β.11 When α = β, the α-VCG mechanism
of course maintains its truthful dominant-strategy equilibrium. Another good mechanism in
this case is the α-GFP mechanism, which differs from the α-GSP mechanism in its use of
first-price rather than second-price payments. While sharing the latter’s non-truthfulness it
possesses a unique Bayes-Nash equilibrium for any value of α, and this equilibrium yields
the bidder-optimal core outcome [14].
Given these results it is quite natural to ask how successful the α-VCG and α-GFP mech-
anisms are in maintaining an efficient equilibrium outcome when α 6= β. The answer to this
question is strikingly similar to the complete-information case in that the non-truthful mech-
anism is again more robust, for arbitrary values of α and β and independent and identically
distributed valuations according to any distribution satisfying mild technical conditions. Our
analysis uses Myerson’s classical characterization of possible equilibrium bids to identify, for
either of the two mechanisms, conditions on α and β that are necessary and sufficient for
equilibrium existence. The conditions for the α-VCG mechanism turn out to be more de-
manding. Just as we did for complete-information environments, we begin by considering a
11Gomes and Sweeney [28] gave a characterization of those values of α that enable equilibrium existence
in this case. The result can be strengthened in our setting to show that for some values of β no choice of α
leads to an efficient equilibrium.
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special case, this time with two positions, three bidders, and valuations drawn uniformly at
random from the unit interval. The special case is used to build intuition, and introduce the
necessary machinery, for the general result.
4.1 Two Positions and Three Bidders
Let v1, v2, v3 be drawn independently from the uniform distribution on [0, 1]. Let α, β ∈ R2≥
with α2, β2 > 0, and assume without loss of generality that α1 = β1 = 1. Our goal will
again be to characterize the values of α and β for which given mechanisms of interest,
in this case the α-GFP and α-VCG mechanisms, admit an efficient equilibrium. Behavior
under incomplete information can be described by a profile of bidding functions, one for each
bidder, that map the bidder’s value to its bid. It is clear that in a symmetric setting like ours
efficient outcomes can only result from symmetric bidding functions, so we will be interested
in functions bF : R → R that yield an efficient equilibrium in the α-GFP mechanism and
functions bV : R→ R that achieve the same in the α-VCG mechanism.
The standard technique for equilibrium analysis under incomplete information uses a
seminal result of Myerson that characterizes the expected allocation and payments in equi-
librium in terms of the allocation probabilities induced by a mechanism and bidders’ bidding
functions. The result was originally formulated for truthful mechanisms, but equivalent con-
ditions exist for arbitrary bidding functions that instead of being in equilibrium provide a
best response among values in their range. The latter is obviously a necessary condition for
equilibrium, and can be turned into a sufficient condition by arguing that no better response
exists outside the range. For our setting and notation we have the following result.
Lemma 3 (Myerson [39]). Consider a position auction for an environment with n bidders, k
positions, and β ∈ Rk≥. Assume that bidders use a bidding function b with range X, and that
a bidder with value v is consequently assigned position s ∈ {1, . . . , k} with probability Ps(v).
Then u(b(v), v) = maxx∈X u(x, v) for all v ∈ [0, v¯] if and only if the following holds:
(a) the expected allocation
∑k
s=1 Ps(v)βs is non-decreasing in v, and
(b) the payment function p satisfies
E[p(v)] = p(0) +
k∑
s=1
βs
∫ v
0
dPs(z)
dz
z dz. (29)
All mechanisms we consider set p(0) = 0 and use an efficient allocation rule, for which
Ps(v) =
(
n− 1
s− 1
)
(1− F (v))s−1(F (v))n−s
and (a) is satisfied. Together with our assumptions on F , efficiency mandates further that b
must increase almost everywhere.
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In the special case with two positions and three bidders with values distributed uniformly
on the unit interval we have that P1(v) = F
2(v) = v2 and P2(v) =
(
2
1
)
F (v)(1−F (v)) = 2v(1−
v), payments in any efficient equilibrium can thus be described by a function pE : R → R
satisfying
E[pE(v)] = β1
∫ v
0
dP1(z)
dz
z dz + β2
∫ v
0
dP2(z)
dz
z dz
=
2
3
β1v
3 + β2v
2 − 4
3
β2v
3. (30)
A candidate equilibrium bidding function for the α-GFP mechanism can now be obtained
by writing the expected payment in terms of bidding function bF , equating the resulting
expression with (30), and solving for bF . In the α-GFP mechanism a bidder with value v
that is allocated position s pays αsb
F (v), its expected payment therefore satisfies
E[pF (v)] = P1(v)α1bF (v) + P2(v)α2bF (v)
= (α1v
2 + 2α2v − 2α2v2)bF (v). (31)
By Lemma 3 the expressions in (30) and (31) must be the same. Equating them yields
bF (v) =
2/3 · v3 − 4/3 · β2v3 + β2v2
v2 − 2α2v2 + 2α2v
when v > 0, and we can set bF (0) = 0 for convenience.12 Bidding below bF (0) = 0 is
impossible, bidding above bF (v¯) is dominated,13 and bF satisfies the second condition of
Lemma 3 by construction. The α-GFP mechanism thus has an efficient equilibrium if and
only if bF is increasing almost everywhere. Taking the derivative we obtain
dbF (v)
dv
=
(4
3
v − 8
3
β2v + β2)(v − 2α2v + 2α2)
(v − 2α2v + 2α2)2 −
(1− 2α2)(23v2 − 43β2v2 + β2v)
(v − 2α2v + 2α2)2 .
The sign of this expression is determined by the sign of its numerator, and it turns out
that the numerator is positive at 0 and, depending on the value of β2, either non-decreasing
everywhere on [0, 1] or decreasing everywhere on [0, 1]. Indeed, dbF (v)/dv|v=0 = β2/(2α2) >
0, and the derivative of the numerator, (4/3− 8/3β2)(v− 2α2v+ 2α2), is non-negative when
β2 ≤ 1/2 and negative when β2 > 1/2. In the case where β2 > 1/2 we need that
dbF (v)
dv
∣∣∣∣
v=1
=
(
4
3
− 5
3
β2
)
− (1− 2α2)
(
2
3
− 1
3
β2
)
≥ 0,
which holds when
α2 ≥ 2β2 − 1
2− β2 .
12Application of l’Hospital’s rule shows that limv→0 bF (v) = 0, so this choice makes bF increasing.
13Since equilibrium bidding functions must be increasing almost everywhere, bidding above bF (v¯) would
not increase the probability of winning, and it would also not lead to a lower payment.
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We conclude that the α-GFP mechanism possesses an efficient equilibrium if and only if
β2 ≤ 1/2 or α2 ≥ (2β2 − 1)/(2− β2).
Analogously, in the α-VCG mechanism, the payment of a bidder with value v satisfies
E[pV (v)] = P1(v)
[
(α1 − α2)
∫ v
0
2t
v2
bV (t) dt+ α2
∫ v
0
2(v − t)
v2
bV (t) dt
]
+ P2(v)α2
∫ v
0
1
v
bV (t) dt
= (2α1 − 4α2)
∫ v
0
tbV (t) dt+ 2α2
∫ v
0
bV (t) dt, (32)
where 2t/v2 = 2F (t)f(t)/F (v)2 and 2(v − t)/v2 = 2F (v − t)f(t)/F (v)2 are the densities
of the second and third highest values given that the bidder’s value v is the highest, and
1/v = f(t)/F (v) is the density of the third highest value given that v is the second highest.
By Lemma 3 the expressions in (30) and (32) must again be the same. Taking the derivatives
of both and solving for bV (v) yields
bV (v) =
2v2 − 4β2v2 + 2β2v
2v − 4α2v + 2α2
when v < 1, and we can extend bV appropriately when v = 1.14 By the same argument
as before, the α-VCG mechanism has an efficient equilibrium if and only if bV is increasing
almost everywhere. Taking the derivative we obtain
dbV (v)
dv
=
(4v − 8β2v + 2β2)(2v − 4α2v + 2α2)
(2v − 4α2v + 2α2)2 −
(2− 4α2)(2v2 − 4β2v2 + 2β2v)
(2v − 4α2v + 2α2)2 .
When α2 < 1 the sign of this expression is determined by its numerator, which is positive
at 0 and, depending on the value of β2, either non-decreasing everywhere on [0, 1] or de-
creasing everywhere on [0, 1]. Indeed, dbF (v)/dv|v=0 = β2/α2 > 0, and the derivative of the
numerator, (4 − 8β2)(2v − 4α2v + 2α2), is non-negative when β2 ≤ 1/2 and negative when
β2 > 1/2. When β2 > 1/2 we need that
dbV (v)
dv
∣∣∣∣
v=1
=
(4− 6β2)(2− 2α2)− (2− 4α2)(2− 2β2)
(2− 2α2)2 ≥ 0,
which for α2 < 1 holds when
α2 ≥ 2− 1
β2
.
When α2 = 1 the above reasoning still applies as long as v < 1, so b
V (v) is increasing almost
everywhere when
lim
v→1
dbV (v)
dv
≥ 0.
14We have assumed that α2 > 0, so the denominator vanishes only when v = α2 = 1. If β2 < 1, then
limv→1 bV (v) =∞. If β2 = 1, application of l’Hospital’s rule shows that limv→1 bV (v) = 1.
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Figure 2: Comparison of the α-GFP and α-VCG mechanisms under incomplete information,
for a setting with two positions, three bidders, and valuations drawn independently and
uniformly from [0, 1]. The hatched areas indicate the combinations of α2 and β2 for which
the mechanisms respectively possess an efficient equilibrium, when α1 = α2 = 1. The dotted
line at β2 = 0.8 intersects the curve for the α-GFP mechanism at α2 = 0.5 and that for the
α-VCG mechanism at α2 = 0.75. For all points between the intersection points the α-GFP
mechanism has an efficient equilibrium and the α-VCG mechanism does not.
This is indeed the case, as limv→1 dbV (v)/dv = ∞ when β2 < 1, and limv→1 dbV (v)/dv = 1
when β2 = 1 by applying l’Hospital’s rule twice. We conclude that the α-VCG mechanism
possesses an efficient equilibrium if and only if β2 ≤ 1/2 or α2 ≥ 2− 1/β2.
It is now not hard to see that the equilibrium condition for the α-GFP mechanism is
easier to satisfy than that for the α-VCG mechanism. In fact, for the α-VCG mechanism,
efficient equilibria may cease to exist even when α2 is very close to β2. When β2 = 0.8, for
example, any value of α2 ≥ 0.5 would suffice for the α-GFP mechanism, while the α-VCG
mechanism would require that α2 ≥ 0.75. An illustration is provided in Figure 2. Figure 3
compares the derivatives of the respective bidding functions for β2 = 0.8 and varying values
of α2.
4.2 The General Case
Superiority of the non-truthful mechanism in preserving an efficient equilibrium again holds
in general. We proceed to establish a weak superiority for any number of positions and
bidders and arbitrary symmetric valuation distributions, and note that examples showing a
strict separation are straightforward to construct and have indeed been given for a specific
setting.
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Figure 3: Derivatives of the candidate bidding functions for the α-GFP and α-VCG mech-
anisms in a setting with three bidders with values distributed uniformly on [0, 1] and two
positions with β = (1, 0.8), when α1 = 1 and α2 ranges from 0.8 to 0.1.
Theorem 2. Let α, β ∈ Rk≥. Let v ∈ Rn, with components drawn independently from a
continuous distribution with bounded support. Then the α-GFP mechanism possesses an
efficient Bayes-Nash equilibrium for valuations given by β and v whenever the α-VCG mech-
anism does.
To obtain this general result we will follow the same basic strategy as in the special case,
but will have to overcome two major difficulties on the way.
The first difficulty concerns the equilibrium bidding function for the α-VCG mechanism.
Whereas deriving a bidding function for the α-GFP mechanism remains relatively straight-
forward even for an arbitrary number of positions and arbitrary valuation distributions, the
situation becomes significantly more complex for the α-VCG mechanism due to the depen-
dence of its payment rule on the bids for all lower positions. Specifically, when equating
the two expressions for the expected payment in equilibrium, (30) and (32) in the special
case, and taking derivatives on both sides, the integrand in the latter no longer depends only
on t, the variable of integration. Instead, the conditional densities of the values of bidders
assigned lower positions introduce a dependence on v. When taking the derivative one would
expect to obtain a differential equation, and a closed form solution to this differential equa-
tion would be required to continue with the rest of the argument. We take a different route
and use a rather surprising combinatorial equivalence to obtain an alternative expression for
the expected payment that only depends on t.
A second difficulty arises when trying to show that bF is increasing for a wider range of
values of α and β than bV . In the special case we could argue directly about the derivatives
of the bidding functions, but this type of argument becomes infeasible rather quickly when
increasing the number of positions or moving to general value distributions. The key insight
that will allow us to generalize the result is that there exist functions A : R → R and
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B : R → R such that bF (v) = A(v)/B(v) and bV (v) = A′(v)/B′(v), where A′ and B′
respectively denote the derivatives of A and B. This relationship is easily verified for (30)
and (32) but continues to hold in general. We use it to show that at the minimum value of v
for which dbF (v)/dv is non-positive, should such a value exist, dbV (v)/dv is non-positive as
well.
We begin by deriving candidate equilibrium bidding functions for the two mechanisms.
Due to the more complicated structure of the payments, the case of the α-VCG mechanism
is significantly more challenging.
Lemma 4. Let α, β ∈ Rk≥ with αk > 0 and βk > 0. Suppose valuations are drawn from
a distribution with support [0, v¯], probability density function f , and cumulative distribution
function F . Then, an efficient equilibrium of the α-GFP mechanism must use a bidding
function bF with
bF (v) =
∑k
s=1 βs
∫ v
0
dPs(t)
dt
t dt∑k
s=1 αsPs(v)
.
If bF is increasing almost everywhere, it constitutes the unique efficient equilibrium. Other-
wise no efficient equilibrium exists.
Lemma 5. Let α, β ∈ Rk≥ with αk > 0 and βk > 0. Suppose valuations are drawn from
a distribution with support [0, v¯], probability density function f , and cumulative distribution
function F . Then, an efficient equilibrium of the α-VCG mechanism must use a bidding
function bV with
bV (v) =
∑k
s=1 βs
dPs(v)
dv
v∑k
s=1 αs
dPs(v)
dv
.
If bV is increasing almost everywhere, it constitutes the unique efficient equilibrium. Other-
wise no efficient equilibrium exists.
Even with the candidate bidding functions bF and bV in hand, the cases where the α-GFP
and α-VCG mechanisms respectively admit an efficient equilibrium seem difficult to compare.
What will ultimately drive the proof of Theorem 2 is a rather curious relationship between
the two bidding functions that is straightforward to verify given Lemma 4 and Lemma 5:
the numerator of bV is equal to the derivative of the numerator of bF , and the denominator
of bV is equal to the derivative of the denominator of bF .
Corollary 2. Let bF : R→ R and bV : R→ R be the candidate equilibrium bidding functions
for the α-GFP and α-VCG mechanisms as defined in Lemma 4 and Lemma 5. Then
bF (v) =
A(v)
B(v)
and bV (v) =
A′(v)
B′(v)
,
where A(v) =
∑k
s=1 βs
∫ v
0
dPs(t)
dt
t dt and B(v) =
∑k
s=1 αsPs(v).
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Figure 4: Possible forms of the derivative of the candidate equilibrium bidding function bF
when the α-GFP mechanism does not possess an equilibrium. Both the derivative and the
second derivative are non-negative at zero, so if the former is non-positive anywhere on (0, v¯]
there must be a value v∗ > 0 where it either touches or cuts the x-axis from above.
To show that the α-GFP mechanism possesses an efficient equilibrium whenever the α-
VCG mechanism does we recall that equilibrium existence is equivalent to a bidding function
that is increasing almost everywhere. We first consider the candidate bidding function for
the α-GFP mechanism and show that at v = 0, either its derivative is positive or both its
derivative and second derivative are non-negative. Failure to possess an equilibrium thus
implies existence of a value v∗ > 0 where the derivative cuts the x-axis from above, or of a
set of such values with positive measure where it touches the x-axis. In a second step we
then show that the candidate bidding function for the α-VCG mechanism behaves roughly
in the same way at these values. The situation is illustrated in Figure 4.
Lemma 6. Let bF : R → R be the candidate equilibrium bidding function for the α-GFP
mechanisms as defined in Lemma 4. Then,
dbF (v)
dv
∣∣∣∣
v=0
=
n− k
n− k + 1 ·
βk
αk
.
Lemma 7. Let bF : R → R be the candidate equilibrium bidding function for the α-GFP
mechanisms as defined in Lemma 4. Then, for n = k,
d2bF (v)
dv2
∣∣∣∣
v=0
≥ 0.
Proof of Theorem 2. Assume that the α-GFP mechanism does not possess an equilibrium,
and recall that this implies the existence of a set of values with positive measure where the
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derivative of bF is not strictly increasing. By Lemmas 6 and 7, there must thus exist a set
of values v∗ > 0 with positive measure where
dbF (v)
dv
∣∣∣∣
v=v∗
= 0 and
d2bF (v)
dv2
∣∣∣∣
v=v∗
≤ 0,
or one such value where the equality holds and the inequality is strict.
For an arbitrary value v,
dbF (v)
dv
=
A′(v)B(v)−B′(v)A(v)
(B(v))2
= 0
requires that
A′(v)B(v)−B′(v)A(v) = 0. (33)
Assuming (33),
d2bF (v)
dv2
=
A′′(v)B(v)−B′′(v)A(v)
(B(v))2
≤ 0
requires that
A′′(v)B(v)−B′′(v)A(v) ≤ 0, (34)
Consider any v∗ > 0, and observe that A(v∗) > 0 and A′(v∗) > 0. For v = v∗ we can thus
rewrite (33) as B(v∗) = B
′(v∗)A(v∗)
A′(v) , and substitute this into (34) to obtain
A′′(v∗)
B′(v∗)A(v∗)
A′(v∗)
−B′′(v∗)A(v∗) ≤ 0.
Dividing by A(v∗) > 0 and multiplying by A′(v∗) > 0 yields
A′′(v∗)B′(v∗)− A′(v∗)B′′(v∗) ≤ 0,
and thus
bV (v)
dv
∣∣∣∣
v=v∗
=
A′′(v∗)B′(v∗)− A′(v∗)B′′(v∗)
(B′(v∗))2
≤ 0.
It is, moreover, easily verified that the inequality holds strictly when d2bF (v)/dv2|v=v∗ < 0.
There thus exists a set of values v∗ with positive measure where b
V (v)
dv
≤ 0, and the claim
follows.
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A Complete Information: Three Positions and Four
Bidders
Assume without loss of generality that v1 ≥ v2 ≥ v3 ≥ v4 > 0, and in addition that
β1 > β2 > β3 > 0. Efficiency then requires that
b1 ≥ b2 ≥ b3 ≥ b4. (35)
For b to be an equilibrium, none of the bidders may benefit from raising or lowering their
respective bid and being assigned a different position, which for the α-VCG mechanism
means that
β1v1 − (α1 − α2)b2 − (α2 − α3)b3 − α3b4 ≥ β2v1 − (α2 − α3)b3 − α3b4, (36)
β1v1 − (α1 − α2)b2 − (α2 − α3)b3 − α3b4 ≥ β3v1 − α3b4, (37)
β1v1 − (α1 − α2)b2 − (α2 − α3)b3 − α3b4 ≥ 0, (38)
β2v2 − (α2 − α3)b3 − α3b4 ≥ β1v2 − (α1 − α2)b1 − (α2 − α3)b3 − α3b4, (39)
β2v2 − (α2 − α3)b3 − α3b4 ≥ β3v2 − α3b4, (40)
β2v2 − (α2 − α3)b3 − α3b4 ≥ 0, (41)
β3v3 − α3b4 ≥ β1v3 − (α1 − α2)b1 − (α2 − α3)b2 − α3b4, (42)
β3v3 − α3b4 ≥ β2v3 − (α2 − α3)b2 − α3b4, (43)
β3v3 − α3b4 ≥ 0, (44)
0 ≥ β1v4 − (α1 − α2)b1 − (α2 − α3)b2 − α3b3, (45)
0 ≥ β2v4 − (α2 − α3)b2 − α3b3, (46)
0 ≥ β3v4 − α3b3. (47)
By (39), (α1 − α2)b1 ≥ (β1 − β2)v2 and thus α1 > α2. By (43), (α2 − α3)b2 ≥ (β2 − β3)v3
and thus α2 > α3. By (47), α3b3 ≥ β3v4 and thus α3 > 0. There are no upper bounds on b1
and no lower bounds on b4 except b4 ≥ 0, and setting b1 to a large value and b4 = 0 satisfies
(39), (42), (44), and (45). It is furthermore easy to see that (38) is implied by (37) and
that (41) is implied by (40). Since (β1 − β3)v1 − (α2 − α3)b3 ≥ (β1 − β3)v1 − (β2 − β3)v2 ≥
(β1 − β3)v1 − (β2 − β3)v1 = (β1 − β2)v1, where the first inequality holds because, by (40),
(α2−α3)b3 ≤ (β2−β3)v2, and the second inequality because v1 ≥ v2, (37) is implied by (36).
Since β2v4−α3b3 ≤ β2v4− β3v4 = (β2− β3)v4 ≤ (β2− β3)v3, where the first inequality holds
because, by (47), α3b3 ≥ β3v4, and the second inequality because v3 ≥ v4, (46) is implied by
(43). Since α1 − α2 > 0, α2 − α3 > 0, and α3 > 0, we can rewrite the remaining constraints
(36), (40), (43), and (47) as upper and lower bounds on b3 and b4 and conclude that the
α-VCG mechanism possesses an efficient equilibrium if and only if there exist bids b2 and
b3 such that
(β1 − β2)v1
α1 − α2 ≥ b2 ≥ max
{
(β2 − β3)v3
α2 − α3 , b3
}
,
(β2 − β3)v2
α2 − α3 ≥ b3 ≥
β3v4
α3
.
(48)
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Analogously, for the α-GSP mechanism, the equilibrium conditions require that
β1v1 − α1b2 ≥ β2v1 − α2b3, (49)
β1v1 − α1b2 ≥ β3v1 − α3b4, (50)
β1v1 − α1b2 ≥ 0, (51)
β2v2 − α2b3 ≥ β1v2 − α1b1, (52)
β2v2 − α2b3 ≥ β3v2 − α3b4, (53)
β2v2 − α2b3 ≥ 0, (54)
β3v3 − α3b4 ≥ β1v3 − α1b1, (55)
β3v3 − α3b4 ≥ β2v3 − α2b2, (56)
β3v3 − α3b4 ≥ 0, (57)
0 ≥ β1v4 − α1b1, (58)
0 ≥ β2v4 − α2b2, (59)
0 ≥ β3v4 − α3b3. (60)
For (58), (59), (60) it must be the case that α1 > 0, α2 > 0, and α3 > 0, which is weaker than
the corresponding condition for the α-VCG mechanism. There are again no upper bounds
on b1, and setting it to a large value satisfies (52), (55), and (58). Since β3v1 − α3b4 ≥
β3v2−α3b4 ≥ β3v3−α3b4 ≥ 0, where the first two inequalities hold because v1 ≥ v2 ≥ v3 and
the third inequality by (57), (51) is implied by (50) and (54) by (53). Since β2v1 − α2b3 ≥
β2v1− (β2−β3)v2−α3b4 ≥ β2v1− (β2−β3)v1−α3b4 = β3v1−α3b4, where the first inequality
holds because, by (53), α2b3 ≤ (β2−β3)v2 +α3b4, and the second inequality because v1 ≥ v2,
(50) is implied by (49). Since α1 > 0, α2 > 0, and α3 > 0, we can rewrite the remaining
constraints (49), (53), (56), (57), (59), and (60) as upper and lower bounds on b2, b3, and
b4 and conclude that the α-GSP mechanism possesses an efficient equilibrium if and only if
there exist bids b2, b3, and b4 such that
(β1 − β2)v1 + α2b3
α1
≥ b2 ≥ max
{
(β2 − β3)v3 + α3b4
α2
,
β2v4
α2
, b3
}
,
(β2 − β3)v2 + α3b4
α2
≥ b3 ≥ max
{
β3v4
α3
, b4
}
,
β3v3
α3
≥ b4.
(61)
It is not immediately obvious when these constraints can be satisfied, and why they should
in fact be easier to satisfy than the constraints for the α-VCG mechanism. That b2 and b3
are each subject to more than one lower bound, and that b4 affects both the lower bound
on b2 and the upper bound on b3, seems particularly unpleasant.
In Section 3.2 we established that, even in the general case with an arbitrary number
of positions and bidders, the α-GSP mechanism possesses an efficient Nash equilibrium
whenever the α-VCG mechanism does. This is achieved by considering a particular, maximal,
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solution to the constraints for the α-VCG mechanism and mapping it to a solution to the
constraints for the α-GSP mechanism. Instead of repeating the argument here, we show
strict superiority of the α-GSP mechanism by focusing on the case where β1 = α1 = 1,
β3 = α3, and v3 = v4. By specializing (48) and (61), which requires some work and in the
case of the α-VCG mechanism involves showing that one of the resulting lower bounds is
always stronger than the other, we see that the α-VCG mechanism possesses an efficient
equilibrium if and only if
β3(1− β2)v1 + (β2 − β3)v3
(1− β2)v1 + (β2 − β3)v3 ≤ α2 ≤
(β2 − β3)v2 + β3v3
v3
,
and the α-GSP mechanism if and only if
β2v3
(1− β2)v1 + β2v3 ≤ α2 ≤
(β2 − β3)v2 + β3v3
v3
.
The upper bounds are identical in both cases, and it is not difficult to see that the lower
bound for the α-GSP mechanism is easier to satisfy than that for the α-VCG mechanism.
We compare the bounds in Figure 5, and note that existence of an efficient equilibrium may
fail due to over- as well as underestimation of the relative values of the positions.
B Proof of Lemma 4
Since efficient equilibria must be symmetric, we can write an efficient equilibrium of the
α-GFP mechanism in terms of a bidding function bF : [0, v¯] → R≥0. A bidder with value v
who is allocated position s then pays αsb
F (v), and we have that
E
[
pF (v)
]
=
k∑
s=1
αsPs(v)b
F (v). (62)
The expected payment in an efficient equilibrium is given by Lemma 3, and by equating (62)
with (29) and solving for bF (v) we obtain
bF (v) =
∑k
s=1 βs
∫ v
0
dPs(t)
dt
t dt∑k
s=1 αsPs(v)
.
Bidding below bF (0) = 0 is impossible and bidding above bF (v¯) is dominated, so the claim
follows from Lemma 3.
C Proof of Lemma 5
Efficiency again requires symmetry, so any efficient equilibrium of the α-VCG mechanism
can be described by a bidding function bV : [0, v¯]→ R≥0.
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α3 = β3 β3v1
β3v1+(1−β3)v3
1
1
β3v2+(1−β3)v3
v2
β2
α
2
α-GSP
α-VCG
Figure 5: Comparison of the α-GSP and α-VCG mechanisms under complete information, for
a setting with three positions and four bidders where β1 = α1 = 1, β3 = α3, and v3 = v4. The
hatched areas indicate the combinations of α2 and β2 for which the mechanisms respectively
possess an efficient equilibrium. The common upper bound on these areas always starts
at the origin and reaches α2 = 1 at β2 = (β3v2 + (1 − β3)v3)/v2. The lower bounds for
both mechanisms end at the top-right corner. That for the α-GSP mechanism meets the
horizontal axis at β2 = β3v1/(β3v1 + (1 − β3)v3), whereas that for the α-VCG mechanism
starts at the origin and curves more strongly toward the bottom-right corner as v3 decreases.
Denote by pV (v) the payment in the α-VCG mechanism of a bidder with value v, and by
pVs (v) the same payment under the condition that the bidder has the s-highest value overall.
These quantities are random variables that depend on the values of n− 1 other bidders, and
we have that
E[pV (v)] =
k∑
s=1
Ps(v) · E[pVs (v)], (63)
where, as before, Ps(v) is the probability that v is the s-highest of n values drawn indepen-
dently from F . The conditional payment pVs (v) depends on the conditional densities of the
valuations of bidders assigned lower positions, and on their resulting bids. For s ∈ {1, . . . , k}
and ` ∈ {s, . . . , k}, denote by
I`,s(v, t) =
(n− s)f(t)(n−s−1
n−`−1
)
F (t)n−`−1(F (v)− F (t))`−s
F (v)n−s
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the density at t of the (` + 1)-highest of n values drawn independently from F , under the
condition that the s-highest value is equal to v. Then
E[pVs (v)] =
k∑
`=s
(α` − α`+1) ·
∫ v
0
I`,s(v, t) b
V (t) dt,
and by substituting into (63), exchanging the order of summation and integration, and
grouping by coefficients of αs, we obtain
E[pV (v)] =
k∑
s=1
Ps(v)
k∑
`=s
(α` − α`+1)
∫ v
0
I`,s(v, t) b
V (t) dt
=
∫ v
0
k∑
s=1
αs
[ s∑
`=1
P`(v) · Is,`(v, t)−
s−1∑
`=1
P`(v) · Is−1,`(v, t)
]
bV (t) dt. (64)
Note that the roles of s and ` have been reversed, such that s ≥ ` henceforth. We now recall
that
P`(v) =
(
n− 1
`− 1
)
(1− F (v))`−1F (v)n−`
and consider each of the two sums inside the parentheses in turn.
Denoting
J`,s =
(
n− 1
`− 1
)(
n− `− 1
n− s− 1
)
(n− `),
we have that
s∑
`=1
P`(v) · Is,`(v, t) =
s∑
`=1
J`,s · (1− F (v))`−1f(t)F (t)n−s−1(F (v)− F (t))s−`
=
∑
1≤`≤s
0≤x≤`−1
0≤y≤s−`
J`,s
(
`− 1
x
)(
s− `
y
)
(−1)`+y−x−1f(t)F (v)s−x−y−1F (t)n+y−s−1,
where the second equality holds because by the binomial theorem
(1− F (v))`−1 =
`−1∑
x=0
(
`− 1
x
)
(−F (v))`−x−1 and
(F (v)− F (t))s−` =
s−∑`
y=0
(
s− `
y
)
F (v)s−`−y(−F (t))y.
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We claim that the terms with x+ y < s− 1 cancel out, i.e., that∑
1≤`≤s
0≤x≤`−1
0≤y≤s−`
x+y<s−1
J`,s
(
`− 1
x
)(
s− `
y
)
(−1)`+y−x−1f(t)F (v)s−x−y−1F (t)n+y−s−1
=
∑
0≤z≤s−2
0≤y≤z
z−y+1≤`≤s−y
J`,s
(
`− 1
z − y
)(
s− `
y
)
(−1)`+2y−z−1F (v)s−z−1f(t)F (t)n+y−s−1 = 0.
Indeed, the first equality follows by setting z = x + y and observing that in both sums `
takes exactly the values between x + 1 = z − y + 1 and s − y. The second equality holds
because for any z and y with 0 ≤ z ≤ s− 2 and 0 ≤ y ≤ z,
s−y∑
`=z−y+1
J`,s
(
`− 1
z − y
)(
s− `
y
)
(−1)`+2y−z−1
=
s−y∑
`=z−y+1
(
n− 1
`− 1
)(
n− `− 1
n− s− 1
)
(n− `)
(
`− 1
z − y
)(
s− `
y
)
(−1)`+2y−z−1
=
(n− 1)!
(n− s− 1)!(z − y)!y!
s−y∑
`=z−y+1
(−1)`+2y−z−1
(`− z + y − 1)!(s− `− y)!
=
(n− 1)!
(n− s− 1)!(z − y)!y!
m∑
j=0
(−1)j+y
j!(m− j)!
=
(n− 1)!(−1)y
(n− s− 1)!(z − y)!y!m!
m∑
j=0
(−1)j
(
m
j
)
=
(n− 1)!(−1)y
(n− s− 1)!(z − y)!y!m! (1 + (−1))
m = 0, (65)
where the third equality follows by setting j = `− z+ y− 1 and m = s− z− 1 and the fifth
equality holds by the binomial theorem. Thus, actually,
s∑
`=1
P`(v) · Is,`(v, t) =
∑
1≤`≤s
0≤x≤`−1
0≤y≤s−`
x+y=s−1
J`,s
(
`− 1
x
)(
s− `
y
)
(−1)`+y−x−1f(t)F (v)s−x−y−1F (t)n+y−s−1
=
s∑
`=1
J`,s
(
`− 1
`− 1
)(
s− `
s− `
)
(−1)s−`f(t)F (v)0F (t)n−`−1
=
s∑
`=1
J`,s · (−1)s−`F (t)n−`−1f(t)
=
s∑
`=1
(
n− 1
s− 1
)
(n− s)
(
s− 1
`− 1
)
(−1)s−`F (t)n−`−1f(t)
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=
s−1∑
`=0
(
n− 1
s− 1
)
(n− s)
(
s− 1
`
)
(−1)s−`−1F (t)n−`−2f(t)
=
(
n− 1
s− 1
)
(1− F (t))s−1(n− s)F (t)n−s−1f(t), (66)
where the third equality holds because
J`,s =
(
n− 1
`− 1
)(
n− `− 1
n− s− 1
)
(n− `) = (n− 1)!
(n− `)!(l − 1)!
(n− `− 1)!
(s− `)!(n− s− 1)! (n− `)
=
(n− 1)!
(l − 1)!(s− `)!(n− s− 1)! =
(n− 1)!
(n− s)!(s− 1)!
(s− 1)!
(s− `)!(`− 1)! (n− s)
=
(
n− 1
s− 1
)(
s− 1
`− 1
)
(n− s)
and the fifth equality because by the binomial theorem
s−1∑
`=0
(
s− 1
`
)
(−1)s−`−1F (t)s−`−1 = (1− F (t))s−1.
Analogously, for the second term in the parentheses of (64),
s−1∑
`=1
P`(v) · Is−1,`(v, t)
=
s−1∑
`=1
J`,s−1 · (1− F (v))`−1f(t)F (t)n−s(F (v)− F (t))s−`−1
=
∑
1≤`≤s−1
0≤x≤`−1
0≤y≤s−`−1
J`,s−1 ·
(
`− 1
x
)(
s− `− 1
y
)
(−1)`+y−x−1f(t)F (v)s−x−y−2F (t)n+y−s,
where the second equality holds because by the binomial theorem
(1− F (v))`−1 =
`−1∑
x=0
(
`− 1
x
)
(−F (v))`−x−1 and
(F (v)− F (t))s−`−1 =
s−`−1∑
y=0
(
s− `− 1
y
)
F (v)s−`−y−1(−F (t))y.
We claim that the terms with x+ y < s− 2 cancel out, i.e., that∑
1≤`≤s−1
0≤x≤`−1
0≤y≤s−`−1
x+y<s−2
J`,s−1
(
`− 1
x
)(
s− `− 1
y
)
(−1)`+y−x−1f(t)F (v)s−x−y−2F (t)n+y−s
=
∑
0≤z≤s−3
0≤y≤z
z−y+1≤`≤s−y−1
J`,s−1
(
`− 1
z − y
)(
s− `− 1
y
)
(−1)`+2y−z−1f(t)F (v)s−z−2F (t)n+y−s = 0.
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Indeed, the first equality follows by setting z = x + y and observing that in both sums `
takes exactly the values between x+ 1 = z− y+ 1 and s− y− 1. The second equality holds
because for any z and y with 0 ≤ z ≤ s− 3 and 0 ≤ y ≤ z,
s−y−1∑
`=z−y+1
J`,s−1
(
`− 1
z − y
)(
s− `− 1
y
)
(−1)`+2y−z−1 =
r−y∑
`=z−y+1
J`,r
(
`− 1
z − y
)(
r − `
y
)
(−1)`+2y−z−1 = 0,
where the first equality follows by setting r = s − 1 and the second equality holds by (65).
Thus, actually,
s−1∑
`=1
P`(v) · Is−1,`(v, t) =
∑
1≤`≤s−1
0≤x≤`−1
0≤y≤s−`−1
x+y=s−2
J`,s−1
(
`− 1
x
)(
s− `− 1
y
)
(−1)`+y−x−1f(t)F (v)s−x−y−2F (t)n+y−s
=
s−1∑
`=1
J`,s−1
(
`− 1
`− 1
)(
s− `− 1
s− `− 1
)
(−1)s−`−1f(t)F (v)0F (t)n−`−1
=
s−1∑
`=1
J`,s−1 · (−1)s−`−1F (t)n−`−1f(t)
=
s−1∑
`=1
(
n− 1
s− 1
)
(s− 1)
(
s− 2
`− 1
)
(−1)s−`−1F (t)n−`−1f(t)
=
s−2∑
`=0
(
n− 1
s− 1
)
(s− 1)
(
s− 2
`
)
(−1)s−`−2F (t)n−`−2f(t)
=
(
n− 1
s− 1
)
(1− F (t))s−2(s− 1)F (t)n−sf(t), (67)
where the third equality holds because
J`,s−1 =
(
n− 1
`− 1
)(
n− `− 1
n− s
)
(n− `) = (n− 1)!
(n− `)!(l − 1)!
(n− `− 1)!
(s− `− 1)!(n− s)! (n− `)
=
(n− 1)!
(l − 1)!(s− `− 1)!(n− s)! =
(n− 1)!
(n− s)!(s− 1)!
(s− 2)!
(s− `− 1)!(`− 1)! (s− 1)
=
(
n− 1
s− 1
)(
s− 2
`− 1
)
(s− 1)
and the fifth equality because by the binomial theorem
s−2∑
`=0
(
s− 2
`
)
(−1)s−`−2F (t)s−`−2 = (1− F (t))s−2.
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By substituting (66) and (67) into (64), we conclude that
E
[
pV (v)
]
=
∫ v
0
k∑
s=1
αs
((
n− 1
s− 1
)
(1− F (t))s−1(n− s)F (t)n−s−1f(t)−(
n− 1
s− 1
)
(1− F (t))s−2(s− 1)F (t)n−sf(t)
)
bV (t) dt
=
k∑
s=1
αs
∫ v
0
dPs(t)
dt
bV (t) dt. (68)
The expected payment in an efficient equilibrium is again given by Lemma 3. We can
thus equate (68) with (29), take derivatives on both sides, and solve for bV (v) to obtain
bV (v) =
∑k
s=1 βs
dPs(v)
dv
v∑k
s=1 αs
dPs(v)
dv
.
Bidding below bV (0) = 0 is impossible and bidding above bV (v¯) is dominated, so the claim
follows from Lemma 3.
D Proof of Lemma 6
By Corollary 2, bF (v) = A(v)/B(v) with A(v) =
∑k
s=1 βs
∫ v
0
dPs(t)
dt
t dt and B(v) =∑k
s=1 αsPs(v). Writing the derivative as a limit of difference quotients, applying l’Hospital’s
rule to each of the two resulting terms, and respectively substituting x for 2δ and δ we obtain
dbF (v)
dv
∣∣∣∣
v=0
= lim
δ→0
(
A(2δ)/B(2δ)− A(δ)/B(δ)
δ
)
= lim
δ→0
A(2δ)
δ ·B(2δ) − limδ→0
A(δ)
δ ·B(δ)
= lim
δ→0
A′(2δ) · 2
δ ·B′(2δ) · 2 +B(2δ) − limδ→0
A′(δ)
δ ·B′(δ) +B(δ)
= lim
x→0
(∑k
s=1 βs
dPs(x)
dx
· x
)
· 2(∑k
s=1 αs
dPs(x)
dx
· x
)
+
(∑k
s=1 αsPs(x)
) −
lim
x→0
(∑k
s=1 βs
dPs(x)
dx
· x
)
(∑k
s=1 αs
dPs(x)
dx
· x
)
+
(∑k
s=1 αsPs(x)
) .
To analyze these limits we extend by 1 = (F (x)n−k−1 · x)−1/(F (x)n−k−1 · x)−1, factor
(F (x)n−k−1 · x)−1 into the numerator and denominator, and consider each of the terms
in the numerator and denominator in turn.
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Using γ as a placeholder for α or β and replacing Ps(x) by its definition,∑k
s=1 γs · dPs(x)dx · x
F n−k−1(x) · x =
k∑
s=1
γs
[(
n− 1
s− 1
)
(n− s)F k−s(x)(1− F (x))s−1f(x)
−
(
n− 1
s− 1
)
(s− 1)F k−s+1(x)(1− F (x))s−2f(x)
]
=
k∑
s=1
s−1∑
`=0
γs(−1)`
(
n− 1
s− 1
)
(n− s)
(
s− 1
`
)
F (x)k−s+`f(x)
−
k∑
s=1
s−2∑
`=0
γs(−1)`
(
n− 1
s− 1
)
(s− 1)
(
s− 2
`
)
F (x)k−s+`+1f(v).
Similarly, ∑k
s=1 αsPs(x)
F n−k−1(x) · x =
1
x
·
k∑
s=1
αs
(
n− 1
s− 1
)
F (x)k−s+1(1− F (x))s−1
=
F (x)
x
·
k∑
s=1
s−1∑
`=0
αs(−1)`
(
n− 1
s− 1
)(
s− 1
`
)
F (x)k−s+`.
Since limv→0 F (x)d = 0 for d > 0, the only terms that survive in the limit are those where
the exponent of F (x) is zero. For s ∈ {1, . . . , k} and ` ∈ {0, . . . , s − 1}, k − s + ` = 0 only
if s = k and ` = 0. For s ∈ {1, . . . , k} and ` ∈ {0, . . . , s− 2}, k − s+ `− 1 6= 0. Using that
limx→0 F (x)/x = f(0), we thus obtain
dbF (v)
dv
∣∣∣∣
v=0
=
βk
(
n−1
k−1
)
(n− k)f(0) · 2
αk
(
n−1
k−1
)
(n− k)f(0) + αk
(
n−1
k−1
)
f(0)
− βk
(
n−1
k−1
)
(n− k)f(0)
αk
(
n−1
k−1
)
(n− k)f(0) + αk
(
n−1
k−1
)
f(0)
=
2(n− k)βk
(n− k + 1)αk −
(n− k)βk
(n− k + 1)αk =
n− k
n− k + 1 ·
βk
αk
as claimed.
E Proof of Lemma 7
By Corollary 2, bF (v) = A(v)/B(v) with A(v) =
∑k
s=1 βs
∫ v
0
dPs(t)
dt
t dt and B(v) =∑k
s=1 αsPs(v). For n = k, by Lemma 6,
dbF (v)
dv
∣∣∣∣
v=0
=
A′(v)B(v)− A(v)B′(v)
B(v)2
∣∣∣∣
v=0
= 0.
Since
B(0) =
k∑
s=1
αsPs(0) ≥ αkPk(0) = αk(1− F (0))n−1 = αk > 0,
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this implies that (
A′(v)B(v)− A(v)B′(v))∣∣∣
v=0
= 0.
Thus
d2bF (v)
dv2
∣∣∣∣
v=0
=
(A′′(v)B(v)− A(v)B′′(v))B(v)2 − (A′(v)B(v)
B(v)4
∣∣∣∣
v=0
− A(v)B
′(v))2B(v)B′(v)
B(v)4
∣∣∣∣
v=0
=
A′′(v)B(v)− A(v)B′′(v)
B(v)2
∣∣∣∣
v=0
.
We have already seen that B(0) > 0. Moreover, A(0) = 0 by the definition of A and
B′′(0) <∞ by assumption on the value distributions, so it suffices to show that
A′′(0) =
(
k∑
s=1
βs
d2Ps(v)
dv2
· v +
k∑
s=1
βs
dPs(v)
dv
)∣∣∣∣∣
v=0
≥ 0.
Also by assumptions on the value distributions, d2Ps(v)/dv
2 <∞ for all v, so the first term
vanishes. The second term is
k∑
s=1
βs
dPs(v)
dv
∣∣∣∣∣
v=0
=
k∑
s=1
βs
((
n− 1
s− 1
)
(n− s)F (v)n−s−1(1− F (v))s−1f(v)
−
(
n− 1
s− 1
)
(s− 1)F (v)n−s(1− F (v))s−2f(v)
)∣∣∣∣
v=0
= βk−1(k − 1)f(0)− βk(k − 1)f(0) ≥ 0,
where we have used the definition of Ps(v) and the fact that the only non-zero terms are
those where the exponent of F (v) is zero. Since βk−1 ≥ bk and f(0) > 0, this shows the
claim.
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